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Cooperative Federalism in the
Acquisition of Water Rights: A Federal
Practitioner's Point of View
Sandra Dunn*
There is perhaps no topic in the field of state-federal relations which
raises the hackles of westerners more than the issue of the federal
government's acquisition of water rights. As a result of the size of
the United States' landholdings,' in addition to its broad constitutional
authority, the states fear that the federal government will disrupt their
already over-appropriated systems for water allocation and usurp their
scarce supply. With the memory of non-reserved water rights doctrine2
recent in the minds of western policy makers there lingers a festering
suspicion that the federal government will seek to displace the states
in their role as the primary water resources manager. From the
* B.A., University of Wyoming; J.D., University of Wyoming Law School. The author
is an attorney for the United States Department of Justice, Lands & Natural Resources Division.
The views presented in this article belong to the author and should not be attributed to the
United States or any of its departments or agencies.
1. Based upon a comparison between federally and state owned lands, 31% of the land
within the United States is owned by the federal government. Within California, 47% of the
lands are federally owned, while 85% of the lands in Nevada are held by the United States.
Public Land Stats. 1985 No. 170, U.S. Dep't of Interior, 5.
2. According to the opinion of the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, federal
agencies have the authority to use whatever unappropriated water is needed to fulfill the authorized
purposes of the agency's program unless Congress has specifically acted to prevent such uses of
water. Solicitor Krulitz stated: "Mro the extent Congress has not clearly granted authority to the
states over water which are in, on, under, or appurtenant to federal lands, the Federal Government
maintains its sovereign rights in such waters and may put them to use irrespective of state law."
Remarks of the Honorable William French Smith Attorney General of the United States to the
Chamber of Commerce and the Kiwanis Club of Cheyenne, Wyoming at 5 (June 17, 1982) (on
file at the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter Remarks].
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perspective of a federal practitioner, the states' apprehension is largely
without foundation.
The executive agencies of the federal government have had, for the
most part, an amiable relationship with the states concerning the use,
allocation and development of their water resources. For example, the
United States, through the Bureau of Reclamation played a major role
in the development of water conservation facilities at a time when the
states lacked the financial capability to construct such major projects.
As the federal government's philosophy towards the public lands
has changed from disposition and settlement to retention for devel-
opment and protection, its need for water has increased. With the
government's quest to meet its new demand, the conflict between the
states and the federal government over the country's water resources
has spiraled. During the Carter administration, in particular, the
competition between the states and the federal government over water
became increasingly bitter.
In 1982, however, the Department of Justice repudiated the previous
administration's policy of federal non-reserved water rights and an-
nounced a renewed era of cooperative federalism. In re-establishing
better governmental relations, the Attorney General declared that
federal agencies 3 would obtain water rights pursuant to state water
law, except under limited circumstances.
Despite this pronouncement, the cooperation between the states and
the federal government has been one-sided. The states have greeted
the federal government's requests for water with very little favor.
Several states have demonstrated their distrust of the federal govern-
ment by narrowly interpreting state law to deny legitimate acquisitions
of water by certain federal land management agencies. Two cases, In
re Hallett Creek Stream System' and Nevada v. Peter Morrosi illustrate
the lack of harmony which still exists. This article examines the
wayward attempts by the States of California and Nevada to protect
their systems of water allocation.
THm FEDERAL GovmRN'r's CuRRENT PoLicY REoARDiNG THE
AcQuismoN OF WATER RIGHTS
In response to the enormous controversy over the non-reserved
water rights doctrine, during the late seventies and early eighties, the
3. The primary land management agencies involved include the Forest Service, the National
Park Service, the Bureau of Land Management and the Department of Defense.
4. 44 Cal. 3d 448, 749 P.2d 324, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1988).
5. No.'s 19404, 19511, lip op. (Nev. Feb. 5, 1987) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
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Department of Justice made a comprehensive analysis of the legal
authority supporting the federal government's acquisition of water.6
The Department's legal conclusions were summarized in a speech given
by Attorney General William French Smith to the Chamber of Com-
merce and Kiwanis Club in Cheyenne, Wyoming on June 17, 1982. 7
In his presentation, the Attorney General expressly rejected the so-
called theory of non-reserved water rights. Moreover, he voiced his
opinion that the key to the proper analysis of the issues involved was
to stop viewing them "as a struggle over ownership between the federal
and state governments but as a question of competing regulatory
jurisdiction." 8
Premised upon the in-depth legal analysis done, the Attorney General
disclosed three primary methods by which the federal government can
acquire water rights. 9 First, the Attorney General recognized the federal
government's legal authority to acquire water according to the reserved
rights doctrine. 10 Pursuant to this theory, the government acquires the
right to water when lands are withdrawn from the public domain for
the creation of a federal reservation, i.e., national park, national
forest, military enclave. By virture of the authority granted the federal
government under the United States Constitution," when land is
withdrawn, water is concomitantly reserved to fulfill the primary
purposes of that reservation. 2
The usefulness of the reserved rights doctrine as a comprehensive
means of acquiring water even for federal reservations has been limited,
however, by the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. New
Mexico. 3 Relying upon the history of congressional deference to state
law with respect to the allocation of water, the Supreme Court
6. The Department of Justice's analysis was released in a Legal Memorandum For Carol
E. Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, Federal Nonres-
erved Water Rights, prepared by the Office of Legal Counsel (June 16, 1982) (on file at the
Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter Legal Memorandum].
7. Remarks, supra note 2, at 8.
8. Id.
9. The three methods primarily concern the governments' legal authority to acquire water
rights and they do not include the governments' ability to acquire water by purchase or by
condemnation. Id. at 4.
10. Id.
11. Although there is no question about the authority of the government to acquire reserved
water rights the debate over the scope of federal reserved water rights still continues to rage on.
See United States v. Jesse, Case No. 855A347, slip op. at 15 (Colo. Sup. Ct.) (the Supreme
Court for the State of Colorado recently held that the United States is not barred by doctrines
of collateral estoppel and stare decisis from claiming instream flow rights to achieve the purposes
of the Organic Act).
12. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546, 564-98 (1963); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 143-46 (1976).
13. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978).
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concluded that "[w]here water is only valuable for a secondary use
of the reservation ... there arises the ... inference that Congress
intended ... that the United States would acquire water in the same
manner as any other public or private appropriator.'
' 4
The second method by which the federal agencies may obtain water
is premised on the same constitutional cornerstone as the reserved
rights doctrine. The Attorney General revealed that the federal agencies
could acquire, in addition to reserved water rights, the water needed
to fulfill the specific directives given by Congress when authorizing a
particular project. 15 As a matter of constitutional law, Congress has
the authority to preempt state law governing the allocation of water
resources. 6 Therefore, the Attorney General reasoned that Congress
could expressly order the management of the federal lands in a way
that would be totally frustrated by the application of state water law.
Only under those limited conditions would the federal agencies be able
to assert a right to the water necessary to fulfill the agency's specific
regulatory goals.
The Attorney General inferred from the Supreme Court's emphasis
on state water law in the decisions of California v. United States1
7
and United States v. New Mexico 8 that congressional directives must
be narrowly construed, if possible, so as to avoid a conflict. 19 Con-
sequently, unless Congress clearly expresses an intention to displace
state water law, the federal agencies are limited to that water which
can be obtained in conformity therewith.
Thus, the third and perhaps most critical means of procuring water
for the federal agencies is pursuant to state law. It is under state law
that the Attorney General expected all of the federal agencies to meet
the majority of their water needs.20 The policy espoused by the
Department of Justice emphasizes the acquisition of water by operation
of state law. Rather than support this policy, the states have reacted
14. Id.
15. Remarks, supra note 2, at 4. Although the Department recognized that this exact
question has never been squarely before the Supreme Court, it noted that the following cases
broadly support the constitutional basis upon which the federal government could act to preempt
state laws concerning the allocation of water: Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941);
First Iowa Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946); Federal Power Comm'n v.
Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955); and United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
See Legal Memorandum supra note 6, at 32.
16. See California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 674-75 (1978).
17. Id.
18. 438 U.S. 696, 702 (1978).
19. Remarks, supra note 2, at 10.
20. Id. at 9.
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by attempting to restrict the availability of state water rights. By taking
this position, the states risk the very thing which they seek to preserve:
the sovereignty of the states to control and manage their water
resources without interference or intrusion by the United States.
It is unrealistic to believe that by denying the federal government
water rights, the states can effectively change the water demands of
the various land management agencies. Thus, by their own actions,
the states create a situation wherein state water laws will necessarily
conflict directly with the express statutory duties of the land use
agencies. Under such a scenario, the agencies are left with little choice
but to assert a right to use water under federal law. By having placed
themselves directly at odds with the federal government, the states will
have lost their ability to regulate the government's use of water or to
fit that use into their existing management schemes.
Two recent cases, In re Hallett Creek Stream System21 and Nevada
v. Morros,2 exemplify the needless conflict between the states and the
federal government. Both have resulted from the states' overly strict
interpretations of their own laws. While the states vociferously argued
before the courts that they were defending the very essence of their
traditional water right laws, it became apparent that they were dis-
criminating against the United States. As a result of their doctrinaire
approach to the water requests of the federal government, the states
jeopardized the integrity of the very system they seek to protect.
IN RE Hallett Creek
In 1976 the California State Water Resources Control Board (State
Board) instituted an adjudication to determine the rights of the
various claimants to the use of the waters in the Hallett Creek stream
system. Among the various claimants was the United States Forest
Service who claimed 95,000 gallons annually under the reserved rights
doctrine for firefighting and road watering during timber harvest in
Plumas National Forest. The Forest Service claimed an additional
1,500 gallons per day at Spring No. 5 as a riparian right holder under
state law for the enhancement of wildlife.Y
21. 44 Cal. 3d 448, 749 P.2d 324, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1988).
22. No.'s 19404, 19511 slip op. (Nev. Sup. Ct. Feb. 5, 1987) (on fie at the Pacific Law
Journal).
23. See CAL. WAaR CODE § 2525 (West 1971) (the authority of the State Board to institute
the adjudication).
24. In the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act, Congress expressly declared that it is the policy
1327
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The State Board recognized the federal government's reserved water
rights but resoundingly rejected the Forest Service's claim of riparian
rights.25 The State Board concluded, as a matter of California water
law, that the federal government is not entitled to riparian rights. The
State Board went on to find, however, that the claim for 1,500 gallons
per day was excessive even if the Board were so inclined to recognize
the Forest Service's claim to riparian rights. The State Board deter-
mined that the Forest Service's hypothetical riparian water rights, if
recognized, would be limited to 300 to 500 gallons per day. 6
The United States took exception to the State Board's Findings and
Order of Determination in the Superior Court for Lassen County. The
Superior Court sustained the exceptions of the United States concluding
that all property owners in California are entitled to riparian rights,
including the United States.27
The State of California appealed the Superior Court's ruling to the
Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal agreed with the lower court
that the United States did hold riparian water rights. It went on to
find, however, that these riparian rights are subject to defeasance by
subsequent appropriators.Y Both the United States and the State of
California appealed portions of that decision to the Supreme Court
for the State of California.
On February 18, 1988, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of
Appeal's decision that the federal government can have riparian rights.
However, the court reversed the lower courts' ruling that these rights
were defeasible.29 While this might have been the final chapter in the
Hallett Creek litigation, California announced in its Petition For
Rehearing ° that it will seek a writ of certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court.
In contesting the riparian status of the Forest Service, the State has
offered novel legal theories having little relation to California water
of Congress that national forests are established and shall be administered for, inter alia wildlife.
Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74 Stat. 215 (1960) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 5228 (Supp. III
1985)).
25. Hallett Creek Adjudication, State Water Resources Control Board, at xiv (1983) (Findings
and Order of Determination).
26. Id. at xvi.
27. In re Hallett Creek, No. 16921, at 11 (Super. Ct. 1984) (Tentative Decision and Proposed
Statement of Decision).
28. In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream System, 187 Cal. App. 3d 863, 875, 232 Cal. Rptr.
208, 215 (1986).
29. In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream System, S.F. 25133, slip op. at 35 (1988) (on file
at the Pacific Law Journal).
30. Petition for Rehearing, In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream System, S.F. 25133, at 3
(1988) (denied March 16, 1988).
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law or with the nature or scope of the actual water claimed by the
Forest Service. Given the State's adoption of a dual system of water
rights (appropriative and riparian), 31 it logically follows that the United
States may, when acquiring water rights pursuant to state law, either
apply for appropriative rights or invoke its riparian rights. In the
circumstances presented in the Hallett Creek adjudication, the State
has departed from its existing system of water allocation by denying
the riparian rights of the Forest Service. Because the State cannot
develop a rule of law which specifically discriminates against the federal
government, 32 it has been forced to create a legal distinction between
the Forest Service's claim to riparian rights and that of a private
riparian land owner.
The State's legal position is essentially two-fold. First, the State has
argued that the federal government holds its land in a sovereign
capacity rather than in a proprietary capacity. Therefore, according
to the State, the federal reserved rights doctrine "fully protects any
relevant federal interest in water." '33 To the extent that the federal
government is unable to satisfy its water needs through these reserved
water rights, the federal government can only acquire water by applying
for an appropriative right to water. Second, the State contends that
by virtue of the Mining Act of 1866 and 1870, and the 1877 Desert
Land Act, Congress "severed" the water from the public lands, thereby
also severing the government's riparian status.
3 4
The State's legal explanation for its stance in this case is not
intellectually honest. With regard to its first assumption that the federal
government does not have a proprietary interest in the lands it owns,
the State hypothesizes that the federal government's complete interest
must be measured by the property clause of the United States Con-
stitution." Accordingly, the United States cannot also claim a property
interest derived from the State's common law.36 Put into the context
of water rights, the federal government's property interest in water is
totally defined by the reserved rights doctrine. Therefore, the United
States cannot obtain water under state law if it is premised upon the
common law, i.e. riparian water rights. It is the State's position that
31. For a discussion of California's dual water rights system, see in this volume Markle,
Water Rights in California, 19 PAc. L.J. (1988).
32. North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 317-20 (1983).
33. Opening Brief for Petitioners State of California, In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream
System, S.F. 25133, at 5-6 (1988) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter Opening Brief].
34. Id.
35. U.S. CoNsT. amend V.
36. Opening Brief, supra note 33, at 18.
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the federal government's water rights are only derived from one source
of authority,37 and that is the United States Constitution.3
This proposition must be rejected when analyzed against the lan-
guage of the Supreme Court in United States v. New Mexico. 9 In
New Mexico the Court had to determine the quantity of water reserved
by Congress in the withdrawl of public lands for the establishment of
the Gila National Forest. Significantly, the Supreme Court recognized
that Congress authorized the Forest Service under the Multiple Use
Sustained - Yield Act of 19604o to manage the National Forest for a
multitude of purposes. All of these purposes would likely require the
use of water, such as outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed,
wildlife and for fish purposes. Yet, the Court concluded that Congress
intended to actually reserve water only for the primary purposes of
the forest: "to conserve water flows and to furnish a continuous
supply of timber for the people."141 Where water is needed to fulfill
the enlarged purposes of the national forest, the Court expressly
determined that the water would be acquired "in the same manner as
any other public or private appropriator." 42
It is evident from this discussion that the Supreme Court believed
that the federal government was entitled to an interest in water as
defined by the reserved rights doctrine. It is also evident that the
Court expected the federal government to look to state law, whether
common law or statutory, as an additional source to meet those water
needs which remain unsatisfied after the application of its reserved
rights.
The California Supreme Court joined the United States Supreme
Court in its view that the State's legal position is "unmeritorious." 43
The court held that the federal government has in conjunction with
its sovereign rights, the "common law rights of an ordinary proprietor
under state law." 44 Reiterating the conclusion of the United States
Supreme Court in Kleppe v. New Mexico, the court stated that
37. Were this the case, a logical extension of the State's argument is that the federal
government can obtain no rights to water beyond those rights it has reserved. The State does
not go that far since it is clearly in their best interest to require the government to seek
appropriative water rights.
38. Opening Brief, supra note 33, at 24-25.
39. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
40. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (West 1985).
41. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707 (1978).
42. Id. at 702,
43. In re Water of Hallett Creek Stream System, S.F. 25133, slip op. at 12 (1988) (on file
at the Pacific Law Journal).
44. Id. at 14.
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"Congress exercises the power both of a proprietor and of a legislature
over the public domain." 45
Moreover, the court rejected the State's assertion that only state
appropriative laws could be used to acquire water for purposes other
than the primary objectives of the reservation. An inference is properly
drawn from the decision that the court viewed the state's statement
as an unnecessarily strict construction of the Supreme Court's language
in U.S. v. New Mexico. In contrast, the court concluded that "the
underlying principle of deference to state law [as expressed by the
Supreme Court] extends to any water right recognized under local
law-including riparian rights." 46
Not only did the court reject the first of the State's arguments it
also declined to accept the State's argument regarding severance.
According to the State, with the enactments of the Desert Land Act
of 1877 and the Mining Acts of 1866 and 1870, Congress "severed"
the water from the public lands. Relying primarily on the Supreme
Court's holding in California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland
Cement Co.,47 the State contends that the effect of this severance was
to terminate any federal riparian claims to such lands.4
According to the State, water rights cannot be obtained by virtue
of any federal proprietary interest in the water. Rather, it must have
been acquired by operation of state "appropriative" law.49 When the
federal government issues a patent and terminates its proprietary
ownership in the land, the right to the riparian rights then attaches in
favor of the patentee under state law.5 0 Consequently, since the federal
lands at issue in the Hallett Creek litigation remain under federal
ownership, riparian rights may not annex.
The California Supreme Court rejected entirely the State's argument.
Essentially, the court determined that the controversy between the
State and the federal government in this particular instance was
resolved in the 1886 landmark decision of Lux v. Haggin.51 Summa-
rizing the historical development of water rights in California, the
court explained that upon being admitted to the Union in 1850
California specifically adopted the "dual" system of water rights by
45. Id. (citing Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540 (1976)).
46. Id. at 16.
47. 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
48. Opening Brief, supra note 33, at 30.
49. Id. at 27.
50. Id. at 34.
51. 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
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recognizing both riparian water rights and appropriative rights.A2 Since
the states were entitled to determine the rights that attached to the
federal lands by virtue of the equal footing doctrine, it analytically
followed that "the federal government held riparian rights under state
law as owner of the public lands. '53
The court went on to conclude that neither the Supreme Court's
decision in Oregon Power nor the Desert Land Act undermined the
holding in Lux. First, the court found that Oregon Power was not
dispositive since the Supreme Court did not address the question of
whether the federal government, itself, relinquished all water rights as
a result of the Desert Land Act. Second, the court resolved that if
Congress had intended to "relinquish" the water rights it had in the
public lands "it is reasonable to assume that is precisely what Congress
would have said." 54 Thus, the riparian rights which adhered to the
federal lands by operation of state law were retained by the federal
government.
The court went on to declare that while the Desert Land Act did
not "terminate the interest of the federal government," it did subor-
dinate the government's interest in the waters on the public domain
to the rights of subsequent appropriators.5 5 This conclusion does not
affect the Forest Service's claims to riparian rights in Hallett Creek,
however, since the court went on to reconfirm that the Desert Land
Act applied only to the public domain lands, not to reserved landsS6
Despite the arguments discussed above, the genuine concern of the
State is evident in the public policy considerations raised in response
to the federal government's arguments. It is not the State's funda-
mental concern that riparian rights are in and of themselves inconsistent
with California's system of water rights. Rather, according to the
State, if the federal government is recognized to have riparian rights,
it will enable federal agencies to avoid compliance with California's
appropriative laws and thereby have a "calamitous effect on the State's
management and planning authority." 57 Essentially, the State has taken
a claim by the Forest Service to 300 to 500 gallons per day and
translated it into the destruction of the State's entire system for water
allocation. Such an abstraction is at best a gross exaggeration.
52. In re Water of Hallett Creek System, S.F. 25133, slip op. at 22 (1988) (on file at the
Pacific Law Journal).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 28.
55. Id. at 29.
56. Id. at 32 (citing Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 448 (1954)).
57. Opening Brief, supra note 33, at 46.
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The federal government has a selfish interest in seeing that the
viability of the state's appropriafive system is maintained. As owner
and operator of the largest water resources development in California,
the Central Valley Project, it is not in the federal government's best
interest to erode away the system of water rights upon which that
project has been constructed.
Moreover, the public policy concerns raised by California are not a
consequence of the federal government's assertion of water rights.
Rather, the concerns are inherent in a system which acknowledges
water rights based upon both the doctrine of prior appropriation and
the riparian status of a land owner. Having recognized the potential
for conflict between riparians and appropriative rights holders, the
State has long taken steps to provide a measure of regulation for
riparians as well as appropriative rights. 58 Thus, having championed a
system of water rights, the State cannot now seek to limit its application
based merely upon the identity of the claimant.
STATE OF NEVADA v. PETER MoRRos
The litigation currently pending between the State of Nevada, on
behalf of the State Department of Agriculture, and the Nevada State
Engineer is another example of the states' refusal to cooperate with
the federal government in its attempt to acquire water under state
law. This conflict had its beginnings when the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) and the Forest Service filed applications with the
State Engineer of Nevada for the appropriation of water in accordance
with state law. Although the Bureau of Land Management filed various
applications, this litigation only involves fifteen requests for water
rights for domestic stockwatering and wildlife.59 In addition, the
Bureau requested a water right for 66.5 acre-feet of water for recre-
58. Article X, section 2 of the Constitution of the State of California provides in pertinent
part:
The right to water or to the use or flow of the water in and from any natural stream
or water course in this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably
required for the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not
extend to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable
method of diversion of water. Riparian rights in a stream or water course attach to,
but to no more than so much of the flow thereof as may be required or used
consistently with this section, for the purposes for which such lands are, or may be
made adaptable, in view of such reasonable and beneficial uses.
Id.
59. BLM only sought to have small amounts of water approved, the largest quantity of any
single application was only 0.03 cubic per second.
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ational purposes, at Blue Lake, a natural alpine lake. The Forest
Service's requests included fourteen water right applications for do-
mestic stockwatering and wildlife purposes and for recreational pur-
poses such as campgrounds and picnic areas. 60
The State Engineer, after extensive hearings, filed rulings in 1985
regarding these applications. Three of the Bureau of Land Management
applications were denied on the grounds that they conflicted with
existing water rights. The remaining Bureau applications were granted.
Two of the Forest Service's applications for recreational purposes were
denied because the water sources were fully appropriated. Seven of
the applications were approved for recreational purposes and five were
approved for watering of livestock and wildlife.61
Subsequently, the State Attorney General, on behalf of the Nevada
State Board of Agriculture, filed several civil actions challenging in
part the State Engineer's decision.62 These actions were consolidated
in the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Nevada. On February
5, 1987, District Judge McDaniel issued an order reversing the State
Engineer's rulings as to the stockwater rights, but affirming the
Bureau's water rights at Blue Lake for recreational purposes.
In summary, the District Court determined that although stockwa-
tering is a recognized beneficial use, it can only be granted to the
person who is actually putting the water to such use.63 Since neither
the Bureau of Land Management nor the Forest Service owned the
livestock or the wildlife for which the agencies planned on using the
water, Nevada law prohibited the acquisition of a water right permit
for that purpose.64
Judge McDaniel in affirming the Bureau's water right application
for an in situ appropriation at Blue Lake stated that actual diversion
of water was not a critical element of an appropriation of water under
60. The largest quantity of water requested in the Forest Service's applications was 0.3 cubic
feet per second.
61. In re Applications 36414, 36420, 36422, 36479, 44805, 44883, 44884, 44886, 44894,
44917, 44932, 44946, 44965 and 44979 Filed by the United States Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Land Management to Appropriate the Public Waters of Underground Sources and
Blue Lake in Elko and Humboldt Counties, Nevada (July 26, 1985) (on file at the Pacific Law
Journal) [hereinafter Ruling 1] and In re Applications 42920, 42922, 42923, 43156, 43157, 43392,
43393, 43394, 43395, 43740, 43741, 44398 and 46934 Filed by the United States Forest Service
to Appropriate the Public Waters of Surface Water Sources in Humboldt, White Pine, and Elko
Counties, Nevada (October 4, 1985) (on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
62. Nevada did not challenge the Forest Service's application for water for recreational
purposes.
63. Nevada v. Morros, No.'s 19404, 19511, slip op. at 11 (Nev. Feb. 5, 1987) (on file at
the Pacific Law Journal).
64. Id. at 10.
1334
1988 / Cooperative Federalism
Nevada law. Actual beneficial use, he stated, was the critical factor
in determining if appropriation of water should be granted. 65 Since
Nevada law recognized that recreation is a beneficial use of water,6
it was appropriate for the State Engineer to approve the Bureau's
application for recreational purposes. This decision has been appealed
to the Nevada Supreme Court by both the Attorney General and by
the United States.
From the very beginning the State Engineer has, to his credit,
considered the applications of the United States in an objective fashion.
He has attempted to fulfill his statutory duty in conformity with state
law and at the same time treat the federal agencies "with the same
respect as all other prior appropriators."67 On the other hand, the
questions of state law raised by the Attorney General were only
secondary to his efforts to fend off what he perceived to be a threat
to the State's jurisdiction over its water resources.
Throughout the administrative and court proceedings, the Attorney
General has never denied that the actual uses which the federal agencies
seek to make of the water are beneficial. To the contrary, testimony
was given by various officials of the state government as to the
beneficial impact these water developments would have on the State.
Particularly, the Director of Agriculture testified that the additional
sources of water that the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest
Service used for stockwatering and wildlife would certainly benefit the
range by encouraging grazing in areas of less intensive use. 8 In
addition, the Director of the Nevada Department of Wildlife testified
that they had not been able to develop additional wildlife water sources
due to lack of funds. Therefore, the wildlife water appropriations
sought by the federal agencies would be beneficial for wildlife.6 9
Despite the positive aspects of the federal government's applications
for appropriations they continued to be vehemently opposed by the
Attorney General. The cornerstone of the Attorney General's argument
is his belief that the State Engineer would violate his duty to protect
the public interest if he gave water rights to the United States. The
Attorney General lists the following parade of horribles which he
contends would result directly from the approval of the agencies
applications: (1) the state would lose its jurisdiction over the wildlife
65. Id. at 13.
66. See Nav. R . STAT. § 533.030 (1985).
67. Ruling I, supra note 62, at 42.
68. Respondent's Answering Brief, Nevada v. Morros, No. 18105, at 17 (1987).
69. Id. at 32.
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located within its boundaries; (2) the local governments and mining
interest would lose their authority to access water by losing their
powers of eminent domain; (3) the State would fail to protect the
livestock industry; and (4) the State would fail to protect its revenues
by indirectly discouraging the federal government from diverting itself
of the public lands.70
Furthermore, when referring to the right acquired by the Bureau of
Land Management at Blue Lake, the Attorney General asserted that
the State Engineer "renunciated" the essence of the public trust by
abdicating his duty to "maintain, protection [sic] and preserve" the
lake.7 ' The Attorney General cautioned that the ruling would establish
a precedent for the State Engineer "to approve each and every
application... on each and every natural lake in the State of Nevada"
which the Attorney General claimed was targeted for federal take-
over. 12
Amidst such wild speculation there can be neither good law nor
good public policy made. The State Engineer seemed to be keenly
aware of this fact when he originally responded to the Attorney
General's protest. In rejecting that protest the State Engineer declared:
"The State Engineer may not fabricate a federal-state conflict and
then resolve it under a state "public policy" or law to the practical
disadvantage of the federal government." 73 The Att6rney General
continues to exert his view that it would be per se detrimental to the
public interest to allow the United States to acquire a water right
under the laws of Nevada. With this opposition, the Attorney General
has created his own controversy and his own conflict. In a dual system
of government where the Federal Constitution and the Acts of Con-
gress are "the supreme law of the land," 74 this point of view simply
cannot prevail.
CONCLUSION
From the view point of a federal practitioner, Hallett Creek and
Nevada v. Morros provide frustrating samples of misguided attempts
70. Appellants' Reply Brief, Nevada v. Morros, No. 18105, at 34 (1987) (on file at the
Pacific Law Journal).
71. Appellants' Opening Brief, Nevada v. Morros, No. 18105, at 6 (1987).
72. Id. at 7.
73. Ruling I, supra note 62, at 29.
74. U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, ci. 2.
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by the states to protect their system of water allocation. Rather than
respond to the merits of the federal government's applications for
water on a case by case basis, the states would rather react with wild
accusations and allegations of a federal take-over. By their attitude
the states have erected a barrier between the two levels of government
where none needs to exist. By denying the federal agencies the rights
to acquire water under state law, the states force the federal govern-
ment into asserting a right under federal law. Thus, as a result of
their efforts, the states have undercut the systems they so strongly
want to protect.
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